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Heterogeneous Learning in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Incomplete Information
Quanyan Zhu†, Hamidou Tembine‡ and Tamer Bas¸ar†
Abstract— Learning algorithms are essential for the applica-
tions of game theory in a networking environment. In dynamic
and decentralized settings where the traffic, topology and
channel states may vary over time and the communication
between agents is impractical, it is important to formulate and
study games of incomplete information and fully distributed
learning algorithms which for each agent requires a minimal
amount of information regarding the remaining agents. In
this paper, we address this major challenge and introduce
heterogeneous learning schemes in which each agent adopts a
distinct learning pattern in the context of games with incomplete
information. We use stochastic approximation techniques to
show that the heterogeneous learning schemes can be studied
in terms of their deterministic ordinary differential equation
(ODE) counterparts. Depending on the learning rates of the
players, these ODEs could be different from the standard
replicator dynamics, (myopic) best response (BR) dynamics,
logit dynamics, and fictitious play dynamics. We apply the
results to a class of security games in which the attacker and the
defender adopt different learning schemes due to differences in
their rationality levels and the information they acquire.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed iterative schemes play an important role in the
computation of equilibria and the estimation of payoffs under
incomplete information [2]. This paper studies a two-person
zero-sum stochastic game with an arbitrary number of states
and a finite number of actions for each player. When each
player has a complete knowledge of its payoff function and
has past access to past actions of the others, then there is
an arsenal of tools such as fictitious play algorithms, best
response dynamics, and gradient-based algorithms, that can
be used to arrive at the equilibrium of the game. However,
it is well known that these algorithms may fail to converge
even under the perfect observation of actions and payoffs [3],
[5], [10], [11]. A new learning challenge hence arises when
a player does not know its own payoff function and/or has
no information about the past actions of the other players. In
this case, the player needs to interact with the environment
to find out its expected payoff and its optimal strategy.
In practical applications, we are often in search of dis-
tributed learning algorithms that require a minimal amount
of information and a minimal amount of resources. It is
then natural to ask whether there exists a learning scheme
that demands less information and less memory within a
dynamically evolving environment, and leads to an efficient,
stable and fair outcome. In this paper, we address this
challenge by proposing a class of heterogeneous learning
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algorithms in a scenario where the players do not know their
own payoff functions. At each time t, each player chooses
an action and receives a numerical value for its payoff or
perceived payoff as an outcome of the instantaneous game. In
contrast to fictitious play and best response dynamics which
require the knowledge of the history of actions played by the
other players, our learning algorithm relaxes this assumption.
Indeed, it is often implausible and impractical in applications
to assume the capability of observations of the actions of the
other players. Furthermore, we assume that the state space
of the game and its transition law between the states are
unknown to the players. In addition, the players also do not
have the knowledge of the action spaces of the others. The
question we will address is how much the players can expect
to learn under such circumstances?
We propose different coupled (or combined) and fully
distributed learning schemes that enable learning optimal
strategies and concurrently estimating the optimal payoffs.
In contrast to the standard reinforcement learning algorithms
which focus only on either strategy or payoff reinforcement
for the equilibrium learning, the algorithm that couples
the payoff-reinforcement learning together with strategy-
reinforcement learning enables an immediate prediction and
updates the strategies by updated estimations based on recent
experiences. Our learning algorithms also offer the degrees of
freedom to model different levels of rationality and learning
rates of the players. The ordinary differential equations
(ODEs) associated with the stochastic learning algorithms
differ from the standard replicator dynamics, best response
dynamics and fictitious play dynamics. Particular connec-
tions to logit dynamics and imitative logit dynamics are also
established. Using basic stochastic approximation techniques
from [3], [6], [9], [10] and under suitable assumptions on the
learning rates, we show their convergence to a new class
of game dynamics and asymptotic properties of different
learning algorithms within a class of zero-sum stochastic
games.
The paper is structured as follows. In next section, we
present the zero-sum stochastic game model and provide an
overview of the basic properties of reinforcement learning
algorithms. Section III presents our main results on hetero-
geneous learning algorithms. In Section IV, we apply the
learning algorithms to study security games and provide nu-
merical results. Section V concludes the paper and discusses
future work.
II. GAME MODEL AND LEARNING ALGORITHMS
In this section, we formulate a two-person zero-sum
stochastic game model Ξ = 〈S,A1,A2, {U(s, .)}s∈S〉 where
A1,A2 are the finite sets of actions available to players P1
and P2, respectively, and S is the set of possible states. We
assume that the state space S and the probability distribution
on the states are both unknown to the players. A state s ∈ S
is an independent and identically distributed random variable
defined on the set S. We assume the action spaces are the
same in each state. The zero-sum game is characterized by
a single utility function U : S ×A1 ×A2 → R. P1 collects
a payoff U1(s, a1, a2) = U(s, a1, a2) when he chooses
a1 ∈ A1 and P2 uses a2 ∈ A2 at state s ∈ S, and for
the same choices P2 collects a payoff of U2(s, a1, a2) =
c−U(s, a1, a2); equivalently, U(s, a1, a2)− c is cost to P2,
where c is a constant. In terms of the single utility function
U , P1 is the maximizer and P2 is the minimizer, and both
players are interested in the performance at steady state using
mixed strategies, as to be made clear shortly. The preceding
game model can be viewed as a special class of stochastic
games in which the state transitions are independent of the
player actions as well as the current state. Note that what we
have here is a constant-sum game, where the constant is c. In
the analysis of its equilibrium, we can let c = 0 without any
loss of generality, and hence view it as a zero-sum game.
We have slotted time, t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, when players pick
their mixed strategies as functions of what has transpired
in the past, to the extent the information available to them
allows. Toward this end, we let ft(a1) and gt(a2) denote
the probabilities of P1 choosing a1 ∈ A1 and P2 choosing
a2 ∈ A2, respectively, at time t, and let ft = [ft(a1)]a1∈A1
and gt = [gt(a2)]a2∈A2 be the mixed strategies of P1 and
P2 respectively (at time t), where more precisely
ft ∈ F :=
{
f : f(a1) ∈ [0, 1],
∑
a1∈A1
f(a1) = 1
}
; (1)
gt ∈ G :=
{
g : g(a2) ∈ [0, 1],
∑
a2∈A2
g(a2) = 1
}
. (2)
In particular, we define ea1 , ea2 , with a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2,
as unit vectors of sizes |A1| and |A2| , respectively, whose
entry that corresponds to a1 or a2 is 1 while others are
zeros. We assume that the mixed strategies of the players
are independent of the current state s. For any given pair of
mixed strategies, (f ∈ F ,g ∈ G), and for a fixed s ∈ S,
we define the expected utility (as expected payoff to P1
and expected cost to P2) as U(s, f ,g) := Ef ,gU(s, a1, a2),
where Ef ,g denotes expectation of U over the action sets
of the players under the given mixed strategies. A further
expectation of this quantity over the states s, denoted Es,
yields the performance index of the expected game. We now
define the equilibrium concept of interest for this game, that
is the saddle-point equilibrium:
Definition II-A (Saddle Point): A strategy pair (f∗,g∗)
constitutes a saddle point for the expected game if and only
if ∀f ∈ F and g ∈ G,
EsU(s, f ,g
∗) 6 EsU(s, f∗,g∗) 6 EsU(s, f∗,g). (3)
This now being a finite zero-sum game (or constant sum
game, if c 6= 0), the existence of a saddle point is guaranteed
by the minimax theorem.
We now consider this game played over the discrete-
time horizon, with the players generating mixed strategies,
say (ft,gt) at every time point t. These strategies will
be generated (recursively updated) according to some rule,
which uses the information available to the players. As
indicated before, the players do not know the functional
form of U , that is they do not know the entries of the
underlying matrix, but at each time t they observe the value
U(s, a1,t, a2,t), where the actions are realized under (ft,gt),
and they recall their own past actions. With this information,
P1 and P2 generate, respectively, ft+1 and gt+1. The precise
way of doing this is determined by the algorithm picked, and
there will be several such algorithms as will be discussed
shortly. For each one, our goal is to show that the sequences
thus generated converge to the pair of mixed saddle-point
strategies, that is limt→∞ ft = f∗, limt→∞ gt = g∗, where
the limit will be given a precise meaning later.
A. Learning Schemes
To achieve the saddle-point solution, we suggest the fol-
lowing reinforcement learning mechanism for homogeneous
learners. We use the abbreviation “RL” for “reinforcement
learning” and “C” for “combined”, suggesting that the al-
gorithm involves learning the expected utility as well as the
strategies. We consider combined fully distributed, payoff
and strategy reinforcement learning (CODIPAS-RL) in the
form:

ft+1 = ft +Π11(λ1,t, a1,t, U1,t, uˆ1,t, ft)
uˆ1,t+1 = uˆ1,t +Π12(µ1,t, a1,t, U1,t, ft, uˆ1,t)
gt+1 = gt +Π21(λ2,t, a2,t, U2,t, uˆ2,t,gt)
uˆ2,t+1 = uˆ2,t +Π22(µ2,t, a2,t, U2,t,gt, uˆ2,t)
t > 0, ai,t ∈ Ai, i ∈ {1, 2},
where Πi1,Πi2, i ∈ {1, 2}, are properly chosen functions.
The parameters λi,t, µi,t are learning rates indicating players’
capabilities of information retrieval and update. The vectors
ft ∈ F ,gt ∈ G are mixed strategies of the players at time
t. uˆi,t, i ∈ {1, 2}, are estimated average payoffs updated
at each iteration t, and Ui,t, i ∈ {1, 2}, are the perceived
payoffs received by players at time t.
We identify below five different special cases of this
general class of learning algorithms, each one important in
its own right.
1) CRL0: The first COmbined fully DIstributed PAyoff
and Strategy Reinforcement Learning (CODIPAS-RL) al-
gorithm is CRL0 given in (4) below, which captures the
procedure in [5] for both payoffs and strategies. At every
time step t, P1 and P2 each chooses an action according to
their estimations and their mixed strategy vectors ft and gt,
respectively. Based on the joint action, each player perceives
his instantaneous payoff Ui,t, i ∈ {1, 2}, and updates his
strategy vectors. The strategy and utility updates are not
coupled and do not involve optimal choices of the players.
The players make updates by taking a weighted average
of the current observed payoff and the quantities from the
previous iteration. The indicator function 1l{ai,t} is a unit
vector of appropriate dimension with one of its components
corresponding to the action chosen at time t, ai,t, being 1
and the others being zeros. The step size parameters λi,t
need to be small enough such that λi,tUi,t < 1 for all t.

ft+1 = ft + λ1,tU1,t ·
(
1l{a1,t=a1} − ft
)
uˆ1,t+1 = uˆ1,t + µ1,t1l{a1,t=a1} (U1,t − uˆ1,t) , a1 ∈ A1
gt+1 = gt + λ2,tU2,t ·
(
1l{a2,t=a2} − gt
)
uˆ2,t+1 = uˆ2,t + µ2,t1l{a2,t=a2} (U2,t − uˆ2,t) , a2 ∈ A2(4)
2) CRL1: Algorithm CRL1 given in (5) below is another
combined algorithm that learns the average utility and the
mixed strategies concurrently. This is a Boltzmann-Gibbs
based CODIPAS-RL. In a similar fashion as in CRL0, P1
and P2 select their actions based on their current strategy
distributions. However, the updates on the strategies and the
average payoff follow reinforcement learning and λi,t and
µi,t are the learning rates for the payoffs and the strategies
respectively, satisfying Assumption II-A.6 and λi,t
µi,t
→ 0, i ∈
{1, 2}.

ft+1 = (1− λ1,t)ft + λ1,tβ˜1,ǫ(uˆ1,t)
uˆ1,t+1 = uˆ1,t +
µ1,t
ft(a1)
1l{a1,t=a1} (U1,t − uˆ1,t) , a1 ∈ A1
gt+1 = (1− λ2,t)gt + λ2,tβ˜2,ǫ(uˆ2,t)
uˆ2,t+1 = uˆ2,t +
µ2,t
gt(a2)
1l{a2,t=a2} (U2,t − uˆ2,t) , a2 ∈ A2
(5)
where β˜i,ǫ : R|Ai| → R|Ai|, i ∈ {1, 2}, is the Boltzmann-
Gibbs strategy or the soft-max function parameterized by ǫ >
0, which takes in the average payoff vector and produces a
vector that assigns more weight to the maximum component.
The weight assigned to a particular action ai ∈ Ai, i ∈ {1, 2}
is given by
β˜i,ǫ(uˆi,t)(ai) =
e
1
ǫ
uˆi,t(ai)∑
a′
i
e
1
ǫ
uˆi,t(a′i)
, ai ∈ Ai, i ∈ {1, 2}. (6)
It is clear that when ǫ is high, the output of the β˜i,ǫ function
does not distinguish among the actions and assign equal
weights to them; when ǫ approaches zero, β˜i,ǫ function bears
more resemblance with the maximum function, assigning 1
to the action yielding the maximum average payoff but zeros
to the other actions [4].
3) CRL2: The procedure for the CODIPAS-RL algorithm
CRL2 is similar to CRL1 but only differs in the use of soft-
max function. In place of the Boltzmann-Gibbs strategy, we
adopt imitative Boltzmann-Gibbs strategy which is weighted
by the current strategy vector [7], and is given by σi : R|Ai|×
R
|Ai| → R|Ai|, i ∈ {1, 2}. The component-wise mapping for
P1 is expressed by
σ1(ft, uˆ1,t)(a1) =
ft(a1)e
1
ǫ
uˆ1,t(a1)∑
a′1∈A1 ft(a
′
1)e
1
ǫ
uˆ1,t(a′1)
. (7)
Likewise, for P2, we have
σ2(gt, uˆ2,t)(a2) =
gt(a2)e
1
ǫ
uˆ2,t(a2)∑
a′2∈A2 gt(a
′
2)e
1
ǫ
uˆ2,t(a′2)
. (8)
Collecting all this, the CRL2 algorithm is then as given
below:

ft+1 = (1− λ1,t)ft + λ1,tσ1(ft, uˆ1,t)
uˆ1,t+1 = uˆ1,t +
µ1,t
ft(a1)
1l{a1,t=a1} (U1,t − uˆ1,t)
gt+1 = (1− λ2,t)gt + λ2,tσ2(gt, uˆ2,t)
uˆ2,t+1 = uˆ2,t +
µ2,t
gt(a2)
1l{a2,t=a2} (U2,t − uˆ2,t)
(9)
4) RL2: The learning algorithm (10) updates strategies
simultaneously [1], [5].{
ft+1 = ft + λ1,tU1,t ·
(
1l{a1,t=a1} − ft
)
gt+1 = gt + λ2,tU2,t ·
(
1l{a2,t=a2} − gt
) (10)
5) RL3: In RL3, we normalize RL2 by some constant n
and C. This algorithm has appeared in [1] and is summarized
below in (11):{
ft+1 =
C(n+1)
nC+U1,t
[
ft + U1,t1l{a1,t=a1}
]
gt+1 =
C(n+1)
nC+U2,t
[
gt + U2,t1l{a2,t=a2}
] (11)
The following assumption on learning rates is adopted for
all the above listed learning schemes.
Assumption II-A.6: The learning rates λi,t, µi,t, i ∈
{1, 2}, satisfy the following conditions:
λi,t > 0,
∑
t>1
λi,t = +∞,
∑
t>1
λ2i,t < +∞, i ∈ {1, 2} (12)
µi,t > 0,
∑
t>1
µi,t = +∞,
∑
t>1
µ2i,t < +∞, i ∈ {1, 2} (13)
The learning rate which perhaps has the simplest form that
satisfies the conditions of Assumption II-A.6 is the harmonic
sequence, i.e., (R1) µi,t = 1t+1 . To study learning on
different time scales, we need to consider other learning
rates. Typical learning rates are (R2) µi,t = 1(t+1) log(t+1) ,
(R3) µi,t = 1√t+1 log2(t+1) , (R4) µi,t = 1(t+c′)ρi , 12 < ρi 6
1, c′ > 0. It is clear that the learning rate (R1) is faster than
(R2) and (R3). In addition, by scaling ρi in (R4), we can
obtain learning rates on different time scales.
B. Basic properties
1) Properties of RL2, RL3 and CRL0 : The algorithm
RL2 has been studied by Borgers and Sarin in [5]. The
algorithm RL3 is a normalized version of RL2. This version
has been studied by Arthur in [1]. These authors have
shown that RL2 goes to a pseudo-trajectory of the replicator
dynamics when the learning rate λi,t goes to zero. Similarly
the reinforcement learning RL3 goes to a trajectory of an
adjusted version of the replicator equation.
The learning algorithm CRL0 is obtained by combining
these strategy reinforcement learnings with a payoff rein-
forcement learning (Q-learning). The Q-learning is known
to be convergent to the expected payoffs if all the actions
are sufficiently used and the learning parameters satisfy
the standard conditions. The combination of these two ap-
proaches gives a new learning algorithm called combined
fully distributed payoff and strategy reinforcement learning
(CODIPAS-RL). With this new algorithm, the players will be
able to learn both expected payoffs and the associated opti-
mal strategies i.e., if (ft, uˆ1,t,gt, uˆ2,t) −→ (f∗, uˆ∗1,g∗, uˆ∗2),
then (f∗,g∗) is a saddle point of the expected game and
EsU(s, f
∗,g∗) = uˆ∗1 = c − uˆ
∗
2. Moreover, the strategies are
generated by the replicator equation:
f˙t(a1) = ft(a1)[u1(ea1 ,gt)−
∑
a′1∈A1
u2(ea′1 ,gt)ft(a
′
1)]
g˙t(a2) = gt(a2)[u2(ft, ea2)−
∑
a′2∈A2
u2(ft, ea′2)gt(a
′
2)]
where u1(f∗,g∗) = EsU(s, f∗,g∗) and u2(.) = c− u1(.).
A major inconvenience with CODIPAS-RL, CRL0, RL2
and RL3 is that the rest points (equilibrium states) of the
corresponding ODEs are not necessarily equilibria of the
expected game. For example, all the faces of the simplex are
forward invariant (when started on one face, the trajectory
of the replicator dynamics remains on that face). As well
known, the game may not have an equilibrium on that face.
Therefore, the outcome of the replicator dynamics may not
be an equilibrium. To resolve this problem, one can fix the
starting point at the relative interior of the simplex (for
example, the uniform distribution can be chosen as initial
point). Then, we have the following conclusions.
(S1) If started in the interior, the dominated strategies will
be eliminated.
(S2) If started in the interior, and if the trajectory goes to
the boundary, then the outcome is an equilibrium.
(S3) If there is a cyclic orbit of the dynamics, the limit cycle
contains an equilibrium in its interior.
(S4) The expected payoff is learned if CODIPAS-RL CRL0
is used: f(a1) > 0 implies that uˆ1,t(a1) −→
EsU(s, ea1 ,g), and similarly for P2, g(a2) > 0 implies
that uˆ2,t(a2) −→ c− EsU(s, f , ea2).
Another way of eliminating the non-equilibrium rest points
is to perturb the game. The strategy can be perturbed using a
small deviation from (f ,g), i.e., an action a1 will be chosen
with probability (1− ǫ)f(a1) + ǫ|A1| .
2) Properties of CRL1 and CRL2: Numerically, the ap-
proximation of CRL0, RL2 and RL3 can lead to the boundary
of the simplex. To solve this problem, we propose a mod-
ified version of CODIPAS-RL based on Boltzmann-Gibbs
distribution. These are the coupled reinforcement learning
CRL1 and CRL2. Since the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution
never vanishes, the new algorithm CODIPAS-RL CRL1
based on Boltzmann-Gibbs is well defined for any initial
condition and preserves the property that every rest point is a
Boltzmann-Gibbs equilibrium, also called logit equilibrium,
i.e., the fixed point of the mapping β˜1,ǫ(Esuˆ1(s, .,g)) =
f , β˜2,ǫ(Esuˆ2(s, f , .)) = g which is an ǫ−saddle-point equi-
librium. Thus, by choosing ǫ arbitrarily small, an approx-
imate solution is obtained. The main advantage of this
Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution is that it is a smooth mapping
(a regularized version of the best-response correspondence).
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we obtain ODE approximations of the
learning algorithms in Section II and show the convergence
of different heterogeneous learning algorithms to saddle-
point solutions.
A. Convergence to ODE: the combined learning algorithms
We first examine the case where the players learn via
different schemes but on the same time scale or by the
same learning rate, i.e., the factor λi,t = λt, i ∈ {1, 2},
independent of the players. We use β1,ǫ(gt) : ∆(A2) →
∆(A1) and β2,ǫ(ft) : ∆(A1) → ∆(A2) to denote P1
and P2’s Boltzmann-Gibbs responses to the other player’s
mixed strategies and β1,ǫ(gt)(a1) := β˜1,ǫ(u1(ea1 ,gt));
β2,ǫ(ft)(a2) := β˜2,ǫ(u2(ft, ea2)), a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2.
Theorem III-A.1: The combined learning algorithm with
different learners using CRL1, RL2, RL3 converges to the
joint system of ODEs. In particular, if P1 uses CRL1 and P2
adopts RL2, then the ODE is given by

d
dt
uˆ1,t(a1) = u1(ea1 ,gt)− uˆ1,t(a1), a1 ∈ A1,
f˙t = β1,ǫ(gt)− ft,
g˙t(a2) = gt(a2)[u2(ft, ea2)
−
∑
a′2∈A2 u2(ft, ea′2)gt(a
′
2)], a2 ∈ A2.
(14)
Moreover, if P2 adopts RL3 in lieu of RL2, then one has
the adjusted replicator dynamics instead of the standard
replicator equation.
We now have the following corollary corresponding to
different learning rates for the two players.
Corollary III-A.2: In the heterogeneous learning where
players choose to adopt one learning scheme among CRL1,
RL2, RL3 and with different learning rates, we have the
following results.
(C1) If P1 uses CRL1 and P2 learns through RL2 with a
rate k2 faster than P1’s rate, then the ODE is given by

d
dt
uˆ1,t(a1) = u1(ea1 ,gt)− uˆ1,t(a1), a1 ∈ A1
f˙t = β1,ǫ(gt)− ft
g˙t(a2) = k2gt(a2)[u2(ea2 , ft),
−
∑
a′2∈A2
u2(ea′2 , ft)gt(a
′
2)], a2 ∈ A2.
Moreover, if P2 adopts RL3 in lieu of RL2, then one has
the k2−adjusted replicator dynamics instead of the standard
replicator equation.
(C2) If P1 uses CRL1 with a rate of learning k1 faster
than P2 who learns with RL2, then the ODE is given by


d
dt
uˆ1,t(a1) = u1(ea1 , gt)− uˆ1,t(a1), a1 ∈ A1,
f˙t = k1 [β1,ǫ(gt)− ft] ,
g˙t(a2) = gt(a2)[u2(ea2 , ft)
−
∑
a′2∈A2
u2(ea′2 , ft)gt(a
′
2)], a2 ∈ A2
Lemma III-A.3: (Explicit Solutions of Smooth BR
Equation): Given P2’s trajectory {gt′}t′ and an initial
condition f0, the smooth best response equation
f˙t = β1,ǫ(gt)− ft (15)
in (14) has a unique solution given by the vectorial function
ξ1(gt)(a1) = f0(a1)e
−t+ e−t
∫ t
0
z1,t′(a1) e
t′dt′, a1 ∈ A1,
(16)
where z1,t′ = β1,ǫ(gt′). In particular, if P2 is a slow learner
i.e., gt = g, constant in time, then the smooth best response
equation of P1 converges to
ξ1(g)(a1) = (1− e
−t)β1,ǫ(g)(a1) + e−tf0(a1), a1 ∈ A1,
(17)
which goes to β1,ǫ(g) when t −→ +∞.
Lemma III-A.4: (Explicit Solutions of Replicator
Equation): Given P2’s trajectory {gt′}t′ and an interior
initial condition f0, the replicator equation in (14) has a
unique solution given by the vectorial function ξ1(gt)(a1) =
e
∫ t
0 u1(ea1 ,gt′
) dt′
∑
a′
1
∈A1
e
∫
t
0 u1(ea′1
,g
t′
) dt′
, a1 ∈ A1, with a normalization
factor f0. In particular, if P2 is a slow learner, i.e. gt = g,
constant in time, then the replicator equation of P1 converges
to
ξ1(g)(a1) =
etu1(ea1 ,g)∑
a′1∈A1 e
tu1(ea′
1
,g)
, a1 ∈ A1.
Note that these solutions are in the interior of the simplex
for t finite, but the trajectory can be arbitrarily close to the
boundary when t goes to infinity. In particular, if we assume
that the other player is a slow learner, i.e., λ2,t
λ1,t
→ 0, then,
ξ1(g)(a1)(t) →
f0(a1)∑
a′1∈BR1(g) f0(a
′
1)
1l{a1∈BR1(g)},
when ǫ → 0. The set BR1(g) denotes the set of pure
maximizers of f that maximize EsU(s, f ,g).
Proposition III-A.5: Given any time-varying mixed
strategies {gt}t, the explicit solution to the replicator equa-
tion is ξ1(gt)(a1) = β˜1, 1
t
(V )(a1), where V is the payoff
vector defined by V (a1) := u1(ea1 , g¯t), where g¯t =
1
t
∫ t
0 gt′ dt
′. In particular, if the time-average sequence g¯t
converges to g¯∗, then the explicit solution ξ1(gt) converges
to a smooth best response to g¯∗.
Theorem III-A.6 (Two Different Learners): Consider
two learners: one learns faster than the other.
(T1) Assume that P1 is a slow learner of RL2 or RL3 and
P2 is a fast learner of CRL1, i.e., λ1,t
λ2,t
−→ 0 as t → ∞ .
Then almost surely, ‖gt− ξ2(f)‖ −→ 0 as t goes to infinity,
where ξ2(f) = β2,ǫ(f), and
f˙t(a1) = ft(a1)[u1(ea1 , β2,ǫ(ft))−
∑
a′1∈A1
ft(a
′
1)u1(ea′1 , β2,ǫ(ft))]
(18)
generates the asymptotic pseudo-trajectory of {ft}t>0.
(T2) Assume that P2 is slow learner of RL2 or RL3 and
P1 is a fast learner of CRL1, i.e., λ2,t
λ1,t
−→ 0 as t → ∞ .
Then, almost surely, ‖ft− ξ1(g)‖ −→ 0 as t goes to infinity,
where
ξ1(g)(a1) =
etu1(ea1 ,g)∑
a′1∈A1 e
tu1(ea′1
,g)
, a1 ∈ A1
and the ODE
g˙t = β2,ǫ(ξ1(gt))− gt (19)
generates the asymptotic pseudo-trajectory of {gt}t>0.
Note that this last ODE differs from the replicator dy-
namics, the best response dynamics, the logit dynamics and
fictitious play, etc.
Remark III-A.7: Note that from Lemma III-A.3,
ξ1(g)(a1) = β1, 1
t
(g)(a1). This means that if the trajectories
remain in the interior of the simplex, the time averages of the
replicator dynamics and the smooth best-response dynamics
are asymptotically close (the norm of the difference between
the two trajectories is small when t is sufficiently large).
The mixed strategy β1, 1
t
has full support for any t > 0, i.e.,
ξ1(g) remains in the relative interior of the simplex for all
t.
The following theorem, whose proof can be found in the full
report [12], says that under CRL1, the dominated strategies
will be eliminated in the long-term.
Theorem III-A.8: Consider algorithm CRL1. If a strat-
egy a1 is strictly dominated, then ft(a1) −→ 0 when
t −→∞ and ǫ −→ 0.
B. Convergence to saddle points
From (T1) of Theorem III-A.6, we see that the case
with P1 as the slow learner leads to ODE in (18) whose
solution is given by Lemma III-A.4, which is in the form
of the smooth best response to P2. Knowing that gt also
converges almost surely to the smooth best response to P1,
we conclude that the learning algorithm studied in (T1)
converges to an ǫ−saddle point. Similarly, from (T2) of
Theorem III-A.6, when P1 acts as a fast learner, the ODE in
(19) has its solution given by Lemma III-A.3 and leads to the
smooth best response when t → ∞. In addition, from (T1)
and from Proposition III-A.5, ft converges to ξ1 = β1, 1
t
,
which is asymptotically close to the smooth best-response
dynamics. Hence we can conclude that the algorithm studied
in (T2) also converges to an ǫ−saddle point. When ǫ goes to
zero, the stationary points of these heterogeneous dynamics
converge to the saddle points of the expected game. We
can extend the preceding argument to any combination of
replicator dynamics and smooth best response dynamics.
Using Theorem III-A.1 and its corollary III-A.2, we arrive
at the following result.
Theorem III-B.1: Consider the case of two different
learners in which one learns faster than the other. Let the
initial condition be an interior point of the simplex. The
heterogeneous dynamics: (i) CRL0 with CRL1, (ii) CRL0
with CRL2, (iii) CRL1 with CRL2, (iv) CRL1 with RL2,
and (v) CRL1 with RL3 lead almost surely to an ǫ− saddle
point of the expected game.
IV. APPLICATION AND SIMULATION
In this section, we illustrate the heterogeneous learning
algorithms with an example motivated by computer security.
In a network intrusion detection system, an intruder attempts
to scan the host machines and seek their vulnerabilities while
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the intrusion detector monitors the suspicious behavior and
raises an alarm when attacks are detected. The attacker and
the defender can dynamically adapt their strategies from
learning the history of the behaviors of each other and
their own payoffs. It is common that the learning pattern of
the attacker is different from the one used by the defender
since learning schemes depend on an individual’s preference
and rationality as well as the information observed by
each person. Hence, in the context of computer security,
heterogeneity of the learning algorithm is essential because
it offers extra degrees of freedom to model agent’s behavior.
Consider a two-person game with one party being the
defender (P1) and the other party the attacker (P2). The
defender has two actions available for each play, i.e., either
to defend (D) or not to defend (ND), while the attacker has
two actions either to attack or not to attack. The deterministic
payoff matrix is given by M =
[
5 2
1 3
]
, where the
columns correspond to the defender strategies (D) and (ND)
whereas the rows correspond to the attacker strategies (A)
and (NA). The stochastic payoff matrix U is a function of
random matrix S =
[
s1 s2
s3 s4
]
, whose components are
uniformly distributed on [−1, 1]. It is given by U = M+S.
At the equilibrium, the attacker selects its actions accord-
ing to f∗ = [0.4, 0.6]T while the defender chooses its actions
using g∗ = [0.2, 0.8]T . The strategy pair (f∗,g∗) forms a
saddle point solution to the game EU = M, yielding the
game value 2.6. We show in Figures 1 and 2 the payoffs
and the mixed strategies of the players, respectively, when
both adopt the CRL1 learning algorithm. By setting ǫ = 120 ,
we observe that the payoffs of P1 choosing actions N and
NA at t = 8000 are 2.5890 and 2.6073 respectively, which
are close to the game value 2.6. For P2, the payoffs at
t = 8000 are −2.6578 and −2.5855 for actions N and ND,
respectively. The difference between the payoff and game
value is explained by the soft-max parameter ǫ. When ǫ
approaches 0, the average payoffs will approach the game
value. The convergence of CRL1 is slow. In Figures 1
and 2, we observe that the payoff values and the mixed
strategy probabilities converge roughly after t = 6000. In
Figures 3 and 4, we show the temporal evolution of the
payoffs and mixed strategies of the attacker and defender
using the heterogeneous learning algorithm in which the
attacker follows CRL1 whereas the defender uses RL2. We
initialize the payoffs to be 0 and the strategy vectors fT0 =
[1/3, 2/3],gT0 = [1/3, 2/3]. We set the parameter ǫ = 120
in the soft-max best response function of the attacker. The
convergence of the learning process is shown after t = 80s.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented heterogeneous distributed learning al-
gorithms for two-person zero-sum stochastic games along
with their general convergence and non-convergence prop-
erties. Our results subsume many known results regarding
learning optimal strategies with different time scales and with
different learning schemes. Interesting work that we leave for
the future is to extend these results to stochastic games with
controlled states and nonzero-sum stochastic games with
incomplete information.
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